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The McNulty Memo—Continuing the 
Disappointment 
Keith Paul Bishop* 
In late December 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul 
McNulty announced the publication of a revised set of guidelines 
for federal criminal prosecutions of business organizations.1  In 
issuing these guidelines, the Deputy Attorney General was not 
breaking new ground.  Rather, he was simply adjusting the pre-
viously announced policies of his predecessors.  Yet, these new 
guidelines, set forth in what is known as the “McNulty Memo-
randum,” have been widely criticized.  To understand why, it is 
necessary to put the McNulty Memorandum in historical context 
with its antecedents.  It is only by understanding Department of 
Justice policy for the last seven years that one can know why the 
publication of the McNulty Memorandum has been viewed with 
such disappointment. 
The story of the McNulty Memorandum begins in June 1999 
when Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memoran-
dum addressed to all Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys.2  
The ostensible purpose for the memorandum was to provide 
guidance to prosecutors in making the decision whether to charge 
a corporation in a particular case.  According to the memoran-
dum, guidance was necessary because “[m]ore and more often, 
federal prosecutors are faced with criminal conduct committed by 
or on behalf of corporations.”3  On its face the memorandum was 
thus nothing more than bureaucratic guidance.  As such, it could 
 
 * Adjunct Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law; shareholder in the 
law firm of Buchalter Nemer.  Professor Bishop has previously served as California’s 
Commissioner of Corporations; Deputy Secretary and General Counsel of the California 
Business, Transportation & Housing Agency; and Interim Savings & Loan Commissioner. 
 1 Memorandum from Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of Dep’t 
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ 
speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum]. 
 2 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General to All Component Heads and U.S. 
Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
policy/Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].  In the parlance of the U.S. 
Justice Department, a “Component head means the official who directs the administra-
tion and operations of each Office, Board, Division, and Bureau, i.e., the principal organ-
izational units of the Department of Justice.”  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Human Resources 
Dictionary (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ps/appendix1.htm. 
 3 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2. 
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have been expected to attract little attention outside the walls of 
the Justice Department.  The memorandum, which soon earned 
the eponym the “Holder Memorandum,” proved to be the father 
of a series of highly controversial memoranda issued by Mr. 
Holder’s successors. 
What has made the Holder Memorandum and its progeny so 
controversial?  The core of the Holder Memorandum was its 
enumeration of factors that federal prosecutors should consider 
in determining whether to bring criminal charges against a cor-
poration.4  In this regard, the idea of charging corporations, while 
unknown at common law,5 was not a new idea.  Indeed, over 
ninety years ago the U.S. Supreme Court had found “no valid ob-
jection in law, and every reason in public policy” to hold corpora-
tions criminally liable.6  Moreover, the Supreme Court found that 
the government’s ability to regulate business transactions would 
be vitiated if corporations could not be criminally regulated be-
cause of “the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot 
commit a crime.”7  Given that the notion of criminal prosecutions 
of corporations was well settled by 1999, it might have been ex-
pected that the idea of providing guidance to federal prosecutors 
in making the decision to charge corporations was both appropri-
ate and reasonable.  As it turned out, it was not the idea of prose-
cuting corporations or even the idea of providing guidance on the 
decision to prosecute that was controversial; it was the content of 
the guidance itself. 
The Holder Memorandum enumerated eight factors that 
prosecutors should consider in deciding whether to charge a cor-
poration.8  One of these factors—the corporation’s willingness to 
 
 4 Id. at II. 
 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *464 (“A corporation cannot commit trea-
son, or felony, or other crime, in [its] corporate capacity: though [its] members may, in 
their distinct individual capacities.” (citation omitted)). 
 6 N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909). 
 7 Id. at 496. 
 8 The eight factors were: 
  1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to 
the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecu-
tion of corporations for particular categories of crime; 
  2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the 
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management; 
  3. The corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, 
civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it; 
  4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if neces-
sary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product privileges; 
  5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program; 
  6. The corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement 
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cooperate—became the principal lightning rod for criticism of the 
Holder Memorandum and its progeny.9  The concept of coopera-
tion was not so controversial in and of itself.  Rather, it was the 
Holder Memorandum’s express reference to the corporation’s 
waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections as an 
element of cooperation that proved to be the problem.10  The 
Holder Memorandum made it clear that a waiver of the attorney-
client protections extended to internal investigations as well as 
specific communications with counsel by individuals within the 
corporation.11 
Deputy Attorney General Holder advanced two justifications 
for including a waiver of attorney-client protections as an ele-
ment of cooperation.12  Neither justification is assailable if only 
the interests of the prosecutor are considered.  However, both fail 
to take into account countervailing interests.  Thus, the Holder 
Memorandum was in this respect unbalanced. 
First, Deputy Attorney General Holder noted that “[s]uch 
waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible 
witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate in-
dividual cooperation or immunity agreements.”13  From a prose-
 
an effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to re-
place responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay 
restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies;  
  7.  Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to sharehold-
ers and employees not proven personally culpable; and  
  8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or regulatory en-
forcement actions.   
Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at II (citations omitted). 
 9 See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers, Report, The Erosion of the Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. 
REV. 307 (2003); Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal 
Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111 (2003). 
 10 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not enumerate specific evidentiary privileges.  
Under Rule 501, privileges are “governed by the principles of the common law as they 
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence” except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, federal statute, or rules adopted 
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.  FED. R. EVID. 501.  The attorney-
client privilege protects from disclosure communications by a client that are made in con-
fidence for the purpose of seeking legal advice from a legal advisor.  United States v. Mar-
tin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2002).  The work product doctrine is separate and distinct 
from the attorney-client privilege.  The work product doctrine protects documents and 
materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation.  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 509–10 (1947).  In this article, the attorney-client privilege and the work prod-
uct doctrine are referred to collectively as the “attorney-client protections.” 
 11 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at VI. 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual defines a “target” as “a person as to whom the 
prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commis-
sion of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant.”  U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual § 9-11.151, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ 
title9/11mcrm.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).  A “subject” of an investigation is defined 
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cutor’s perspective, using corporations to interrogate individuals 
makes good sense.  Individuals, unlike corporations, have the 
benefit of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.14  
Moreover, it is likely that individuals will become aware of their 
Fifth Amendment right.  The fact that law enforcement is asking 
questions may in many cases be sufficient to cause an individual 
to call his or her lawyer.  If the individual is subpoenaed to tes-
tify before a grand jury as a target, it is the Justice Department’s 
policy to send a “target letter” warning the individual that he 
“may refuse to answer any question if a truthful answer to the 
question would tend to incriminate you.”15  Even if not advised by 
counsel, the fact that questioning is being performed by law en-
forcement is likely to alert an individual to the potential ramifi-
cations of the interrogation.  Once apprised of their Fifth 
Amendment right, individuals are unlikely to waive that right 
without at least attempting to get something in exchange. 
On the other hand, individuals may view internal corporate 
investigations as having less serious consequences than investi-
gations conducted by federal prosecutors.16  Given the private na-
ture of the inquiry, they may fail to consult with legal counsel 
and may believe that the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination is inapplicable.  Moreover, employees may believe, 
with some real justification, that failure to cooperate in their em-
ployer’s internal review will lead to the loss of their jobs.  For ex-
ample, Smithfield Foods, Inc., has adopted a corporate code of 
business conduct that provides in part: 
  Full cooperation with internal investigations is a condition of each 
employee’s employment with Smithfield.  Any effort by an employee to 
hinder an investigation with false or misleading information, or by re-
fusing to provide information that he or she has, will be addressed 
with disciplinary action up to and including termination of employ-
ment.17 
 
as “a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury’s investigation.”  Id.  A 
witness is simply someone who may have relevant information.  Generally, a target faces 
a higher risk of prosecution than a subject or witness, but a subject or witness may be-
come a target and eventually a criminal defendant. 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself . . . .”).  See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 
(1974) (“[N]o artificial organization may utilize the personal privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination . . . .”); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (“Since the 
privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be utilized by or on 
behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.”). 
 15 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 13, § 9-11.151. 
 16 “Employees often are unaware of the potential personal consequences of cooperat-
ing with lawyers hired by their employers.”  United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 
462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 17 Smithfield Foods, Corporate Governance: Business Conduct, at Part V, 
http://www.smithfieldfoods.com/Governance/BusinessConduct/PartV_Training.asp (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2007). 
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For all of these reasons, persons conducting internal corpo-
rate investigations can expect to face fewer obstacles than federal 
prosecutors when questioning employees.  Recognizing this real-
ity, the Holder Memorandum dangles the carrot of leniency be-
fore corporations in order to encourage them to do the question-
ing for the prosecution.  Prosecutors can then use the information 
gathered in these “internal” investigations to charge individuals 
with crimes.18  The Holder Memorandum’s justification for seek-
ing waivers therefore simply articulates a pragmatic approach to 
making an end-run around the Fifth Amendment.19 
Second, Deputy Attorney General Holder justified seeking 
waivers of the attorney-client protections on the basis that waiv-
ers are “often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the 
completeness of a corporation’s voluntary disclosure and coopera-
tion.”20  From the perspective of a prosecutor, this justification is 
also plausible.  However, it ignores other countervailing policies 
and values that have long justified the application of the attor-
ney-client protections. 
It should be remembered that the Holder Memorandum pre-
dates the headline-grabbing collapses of Adelphia, Enron, and 
WorldCom.21  It also predates the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Presi-
 
 18 That federal prosecutors use the information gathered by counsel in the course of 
internal investigations in charging individual defendants is indisputable.  In 2006, for ex-
ample, the government filed a criminal complaint against George Reyes, the former Chief 
Executive Officer of Brocade Communications, and Stephenie Jensen, its Vice President 
of Human Resources, for securities fraud in connection with alleged backdating of stock 
options.  The U.S. Attorney’s criminal complaint cited interviews of the defendants con-
ducted by Brocade’s audit committee.  The complaint includes such allegations as “[w]hen 
interviewed by the attorneys representing Brocade’s Audit Committee at the end of 2004, 
JENSEN stated . . . .” and “[w]hen interviewed by the attorneys representing Brocade’s 
Audit Committee in early 2005, REYES admitted . . . .”  Affidavit in Support of Complaint 
by FBI Special Agent Joseph Schadler, United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Cal. 
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/2006/ 
ReyesJensencCRIMINALComplaint.PDF.  In response to a survey of federal prosecutors 
concerning requests or demands for waiver of privileges from organizational defendants, 
the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York stated that “the purpose 
in seeking such waivers is to obtain evidence, which we believe may assist us in prosecut-
ing appropriate individuals or entities.”  REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 99 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
corp/advgrprpt/AG_Final.pdf [hereinafter AD HOC REPORT]. 
 19 This approach is constitutionally suspect.   
This Court finds that the government, both through the Thompson Memoran-
dum and the actions of the USAO [U.S. Attorney’s Office], quite deliberately 
coerced, and in any case significantly encouraged, KPMG to pressure its em-
ployees to surrender their Fifth Amendment rights.  There is a clear nexus be-
tween the government ‘and the specific conduct of which’ the Moving Defen-
dants complain.  
Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 337 (quoting Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 
F.3d 198, 207 (1999)). 
 20 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at VI. 
 21 Adelphia Communications, Enron Corp., and WorldCom, Inc. filed voluntary peti-
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dent Bush’s establishment in 2002 of a Corporate Fraud Task 
Force.22  Thus, the Holder Memorandum constituted the princi-
pal guidance for U.S. Attorneys during a period of heightened 
public awareness of criminal prosecutions of corporations and 
their executives.23 
In January 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thomp-
son updated the Holder Memorandum by issuing what soon be-
came known as the “Thompson Memorandum.”24  Although the 
Thompson Memorandum largely copied the Holder Memoran-
dum, the Thompson Memorandum did contain at least one key 
difference (at least in the minds of its interpreters): The Thomp-
son Memorandum was viewed as binding upon prosecutors, 
whereas the Holder Memorandum was viewed as simply advi-
sory.25  For example, the Thompson Memorandum added the in-
junction that “prosecutors and investigators in every matter in-
volving business crimes must assess the merits of seeking the 
conviction of the business entity itself.”26  In contrast, the Holder 
Memorandum spoke of providing “guidance as to what factors 
should generally inform a prosecutor.”27  Despite the Thompson 
Memorandum’s apparent binding nature, it retained the Holder 
Memorandum’s statement that waiver of the attorney-client pro-
tections is not an “absolute requirement” of cooperation.28 
The Thompson Memorandum’s continuing inclusion of 
waiver of the attorney-client protections as an element of coop-
 
tions seeking relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In re Adelphia Business 
Solutions, Inc., 280 B.R. 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 
(AJG), 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-
13533 (AJG), at 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/opinions/ 
ajg/54767_18686_opinion.pdf. 
 22 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Exec. Or-
der No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003). 
 23 In fact, prosecutorial efforts largely focused on individuals, with a few notable ex-
ceptions, such as the criminal conviction of Arthur Andersen LLP, which had been Enron 
Corporation’s public auditor.  Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned that convic-
tion.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). 
 24 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of De-
p’t Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ 
cftf/business_organizations.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]. 
 25 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (2006) (“Unlike its predecessor 
[the Holder Memorandum], however, the Thompson Memorandum is binding on all fed-
eral prosecutors.”); Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solu-
tion or Just a Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 416 (2005) (“[I]t is more appropriate for corpo-
rations to consider the provisions set forth in the Thompson Memorandum as government 
‘rules’ rather than discretionary ‘guidelines’ and prepare for an investigation accord-
ingly.”). 
 26 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 24, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 27 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2. 
 28 Id. While this statement makes it clear that a waiver is not always required, the 
phraseology of the memorandum suggests that a decision to not to seek a waiver was to be 
the exception rather than the rule. 
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eration was consistent with policies adopted by other federal 
agencies in the wake of the Holder Memorandum.  For example, 
in October 2001, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
issued a Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Statement on the Rela-
tionship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement (the “21(a) Re-
port”).29  The report announced the settlement of a cease-and-
desist proceeding against the former corporate controller of a 
subsidiary of Seaboard Corporation.30  The SEC, however, took 
no action against Seaboard itself.  The SEC cited Seaboard’s co-
operation, including Seaboard’s decision not to invoke the attor-
ney-client privilege, as the basis for not pursuing the corpora-
tion.31 
Nonetheless, the private bar’s reaction to the Thompson 
Memorandum was decidedly negative.  In November 2003, the 
Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the Cali-
fornia State Bar issued a public commentary decrying the pres-
sure on clients to waive the attorney-client and work product pro-
tections.32  The public commentary cited the Thompson 
Memorandum as one example of this type of pressure.  The fol-
lowing year, American Bar Association President Robert Gray, 
Jr. established a Presidential Task Force to advocate for the at-
torney-client privilege (the “Task Force”).33  The Task Force’s 
work resulted in the American Bar Association’s House of Dele-
gates’ adopting resolutions in August 2005 opposing the routine 
practice by government officials of requesting waivers of the at-
torney-client and work product protections: 
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association strongly sup-
ports the preservation of the attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct doctrine as essential to maintaining the confidential relationship 
between client and attorney required to encourage clients to discuss 
their legal matters fully and candidly with their counsel so as to (1) 
promote compliance with law through effective counseling, (2) ensure 
effective advocacy for the client, (3) ensure access to justice and (4) 
promote the proper and efficient functioning of the American adver-
sary system of justice; and 
 
 29 Report of Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969, 76 SEC Docket 220 
(Oct. 23, 2001). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 220–21. 
 32 CORPORATIONS COMM. BUS. LAW SECTION, THE STATE BAR OF CAL., AT EVERY 
PERIL: NEW PRESSURES ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 1 (2003), available at 
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/corporations/2003-11-18_public-
commentary.pdf. 
 33 AM. BAR ASSOC., TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT TO THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (2006), available at  http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/ 
abahodreportemployee.pdf.  
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FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association 
opposes policies, practices and procedures of governmental bodies 
that have the effect of eroding the attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine and favors policies, practices and procedures that 
recognize the value of those protections. 
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association 
opposes the routine practice by government officials of seeking to ob-
tain a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine 
through the granting or denial of any benefit or advantage.34 
In apparent reaction to this criticism, Acting Deputy Attor-
ney General Robert McCallum issued a memorandum in October 
2005 (the “McCallum Memorandum”).35  The McCallum Memo-
randum did not revise the Thompson Memorandum.  Rather the 
McCallum Memorandum imposed two new limitations on prose-
cutors seeking waivers of the attorney-client protections.  First, 
the McCallum Memorandum established supervisory review as a 
pre-condition to any request for a waiver.36  Second, each U.S. At-
torney’s Office was directed to institute a written waiver review 
policy governing such requests.37  The McCallum Memorandum 
did not require that these policies be made publicly available.  
Further, the McCallum Memorandum specifically disclaimed any 
requirement of consistency among the various U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fices around the country.38  Thus, corporations continued to be in 
a position in which they could only guess as to prosecutorial ex-
pectations.39  From the perspective of the bar, moreover, the 
McCallum Memorandum did little to reduce pressure to waive 
the attorney-client protections. 
In late 2006, both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives held hearings on the attorney-client privilege and the 
Thompson Memorandum.40  In connection with this hearing, a 
coalition of business and bar associations submitted a report of a 
survey of in-house and outside counsel.41  The report unequivo-
 
 34  Id. 
 35 Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 21, 2005), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.
pdf. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate In-
vestigations: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 130 (2006) (state-
ment of Edwin Meese III, Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Pub. Policy and Chair-
man, Ctr. for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Found.). 
 40 Id.; White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 41 THE COAL. TO PRES. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, SUBMISSION TO THE U.S. 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REGARDING HEARINGS ON COERCED WAIVER OF THE 
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cally cites the Holder, Thompson, and McCallum Memoranda as 
the reasons for waiver demands.  The coalition also reported that 
nearly 75% of the respondents agreed with the statement that a 
“culture of waiver” has evolved.42 
Three months later, on December 8, 2006, Senator Arlen 
Specter introduced the “Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act 
of 2006” which, among other things, would prohibit federal prose-
cutors from conditioning a civil or criminal charging decision on 
an assertion of the attorney-client and work product protec-
tions.43  Perhaps like King Belshazzar, seeing the handwriting on 
the wall, the Department of Justice replaced the Thompson 
Memorandum less than a week after the introduction of Senator 
Specter’s bill.44  This new memorandum was penned by Deputy 
Attorney General Paul McNulty and, like its predecessors, it 
shares the name of its author.45 
If the intent of the McNulty Memorandum was to quiet criti-
cism of Department of Justice policies regarding waiver of the at-
torney-client protections, the memorandum has been a failure.  
The private bar has been highly critical of the McNulty Memo-
randum.  For example, American Bar Association President 
Karen Mathis stated that “[t]he Justice Department’s new corpo-
rate charging guidelines for federal prosecutors fall far short of 
what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental attor-
ney-client privilege, work product, and employee protections dur-
ing government investigations.”46 
Disappointment with the McNulty Memorandum in part 
stems from the decisive and less nuanced action taken last year 
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.47  A little over a year after 
 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: THE NEGATIVE IMPACT FOR CLIENTS, CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Sept. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/coalitionsenjudtestimony.pdf [hereinafter 
COALITION SUBMISSION].  The coalition consists of the American Chemistry Council, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Lib-
erties, Inc., the Business Roundtable, the Financial Services Roundtable, the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of Manufacturers, and 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  Id. at 1. 
 42 Id. at 11–12. 
 43 S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 44 Daniel 5:5–6 (King James) (“In the same hour came forth fingers of a man’s hand, 
and wrote over against the candlestick upon the plaister of the wall of the king’s palace: 
and the king saw the part of the hand that wrote.  Then the king’s countenance was 
changed, and his thoughts troubled him . . . .”). 
 45 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1. 
 46 Press Release, Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Assoc., Statement Regarding 
Revisions to the Justice Department’s Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=59. 
 47 Congress created the Sentencing Commission as part of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984, § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000).  The duties of the Sentencing Com-
mission include promulgating and distributing guidelines for use of a sentencing court in 
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the publication of the Thompson Memorandum, the Sentencing 
Commission had amended its sentencing guidelines to include 
the following commentary in relation to corporate cooperation: 
“[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protec-
tions is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability 
score . . . unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide 
timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information 
known to the organization.”48  In making this change, the Sen-
tencing Commission was influenced by the Thompson Memoran-
dum and the practices of the Department of Justice.49  Despite 
the fact that the Sentencing Commission pronounced its expecta-
tion that “waivers will be required on a limited basis,”50 many 
viewed the change as placing greater pressures on corporations 
to provide waivers to prosecutors.  As a result, an informal coali-
tion was formed to address the issue.51  In May 2005, the Ameri-
can Bar Association wrote to the Sentencing Commission urging 
that it “address and remedy the Commentary on an expedited 
basis.”52  A year later, the Sentencing Commission removed the 
offending footnote.53 
If the intent of the McNulty Memorandum was to forestall 
further legislative efforts to limit prosecutorial decisions based 
upon assertion or waiver of the attorney-client protections, the 
memorandum has also failed in that regard.  In January 2007, 
Senator Specter introduced a new bill, S. 186, the Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007.54  In general, this bill 
would prohibit an agent or attorney of the United States in any 
federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter 
from, among other things, “demand[ing], request[ing], or condi-
tion[ing] treatment on the disclosure by an organization, or per-
son affiliated with that organization, of any communication pro-
 
determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case.  § 994(a). 
 48 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,994, 29,021 (May 
19, 2004). 
 49 See id. at 29024. 
 50 See id. at 29021. 
 51 AM. BAR ASSOC. TASK FORCE ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT (2005), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf.  In 
addition to the ABA Task Force, the coalition consisted of the American Chemistry Coun-
cil, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Association of Corporate Counsel, Business 
Civil Liberties, Inc., the Business Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Washington Legal 
Foundation.  Id. at 16 n.75. 
 52 Letter from Robert D. Evans to The Honorable Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chairman, 
U.S. Sentencing Comm. (May 17, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/ 
letters/crimlaw/050517letter_sentencing.pdf. 
 53 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 71 Fed. Reg. 28062, 28073 (May 
15, 2006). 
 54 Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007), 
available at http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/thompsonmemoleg.pdf. 
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tected by the attorney-client privilege or any attorney work prod-
uct.”55  This bill would also prohibit “condition[ing] a civil or 
criminal charging decision relating to an organization, or person 
affiliated with that organization, on . . . any valid assertion of the 
attorney-client [protections].”56 
The McNulty Memorandum borrows heavily from its antece-
dents.  Yet, it does break some new ground.  Rather than stating 
that a waiver is not an “absolute” requirement, the McNulty 
Memorandum limits requests for waiver of the attorney-client 
protections to only those circumstances in which “there is a le-
gitimate need” for privileged information.57  Moreover, the 
McNulty Memorandum makes it clear that a “legitimate need” is 
not established by the fact that it may be “desirable or conven-
ient” for prosecutors to obtain the information.58  According to the 
McNulty Memorandum, whether a “legitimate need” exists de-
pends upon: 
(1) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will 
benefit the government’s investigation; 
(2) whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and 
complete fashion by using alternative means that do not require 
waiver; 
(3) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and 
(4) the collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver.59 
While these criteria appear to be far more specific than the 
Holder and Thompson Memoranda, the reality may be far differ-
ent.  As an initial matter, the requirement that there be a “le-
gitimate need” sets the bar at the lowest possible level.  The first 
criterion is really no criterion at all—the government should not 
be seeking information unless the information would benefit its 
investigation.  To forbid prosecutors from seeking information 
that does not benefit their investigations proscribes very little 
indeed.  The second criterion is equally hollow.  If the prosecutor 
can timely and completely obtain the information elsewhere, 
there is little gained (and little given) by a waiver of the privi-
lege.  Presumably, prosecutors seek waivers because they cannot 
obtain the information easily by other means.  This was, in fact, 
one of the principal justifications for seeking waivers in the 
Holder Memorandum.60  The third criterion underscores the con-
tinuing self-interested pragmatism of the Department of Justice’s 
 
 55 Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 56 Id. § 3(b)(2). 
 57 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1, at 8. 
 58 Id. at 8–9. 
 59 Id. at 9. 
 60 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at VI.  
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approach to waivers.  In effect, the Department is saying that our 
need for information legitimizes our need for waivers.  The final 
criterion is also problematic.  From a societal standpoint, the 
benefits of the attorney-client protections are undermined when-
ever they are waived.  One of the principal reasons for protecting 
communications between a client and the attorney is to encour-
age full and candid communications.61  If employees know that 
the government will pressure their employers to turn over the re-
sults of communications with corporate counsel, they are more 
likely to limit their disclosures to counsel.62  Ultimately, corpora-
tions will be less able to self-police, remediate and prevent legal 
violations. 
The McNulty Memorandum also divides attorney-client pro-
tected information into two categories.  Prosecutors are author-
ized to seek so-called “Category I” material with the “written au-
thorization from the United States Attorney who must provide a 
copy of the request to, and consult with, the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Criminal Division.”63  The request must specify 
the “legitimate need” for the information and identify the scope of 
the waiver sought.  The McNulty Memorandum does not explain 
the extent of consultation required or whether the U.S. Attor-
ney’s decision to seek a waiver can be overruled by the Assistant 
Attorney General.  For example, will it be sufficient for a prose-
cutor to establish a legitimate need by simply reciting why the 
information will help the investigation, or must the prosecutor 
provide a balanced analysis of the criteria identified in the 
McNulty Memorandum?  In introducing S. 186, Senator Specter 
noted these points and observed that “it is difficult to see how the 
McNulty memo provides better safeguards for Category 1 infor-
mation than the interim-McCallum memo . . . which mandated a 
U.S. Attorney-level ‘written waiver review process’ for all attor-
ney client privilege waiver requests.”64 
Category I information is characterized as “purely factual in-
formation” that may or may not be privileged relating to the un-
derlying misconduct.65  Under the McNulty Memorandum, exam-
ples of Category I information include but are not limited to: (i) 
key documents; (ii) witness statements; (iii) purely factual inter-
view memoranda regarding the underlying misconduct; (iv) or-
 
 61 United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 62 AD HOC REPORT, supra note 18, at 102 (“The possibility that the government may 
require a waiver, and the fear of both the criminal and civil consequences of such a 
waiver, create strong disincentives for organizations to conduct thorough internal investi-
gations, as well as for employees to cooperate in such investigations.” (citations omitted)). 
 63 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1, at 9. 
 64 153 CONG. REC. S182 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2007) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
 65 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1, at 9. 
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ganizational charts created by company counsel; (v) factual chro-
nologies; (vi) factual summaries; or (vii) reports containing inves-
tigative facts reported to counsel.66  Of course, the line between 
fact and opinion can often be indistinct at best.  For example, a 
report purporting to contain investigative facts reported to coun-
sel may implicitly reflect an attorney’s interpretation or opinions 
about the facts reported. 
The McNulty Memorandum clearly authorizes prosecutors to 
consider a corporation’s response to a waiver of Category I infor-
mation in determining whether the corporation has cooperated in 
the government’s investigation.67  Thus, the McNulty Memoran-
dum leaves intact the carrot (and implicit stick) of cooperation 
that had its genesis in the Holder Memorandum. 
If the Category I information provides an incomplete basis to 
conduct a thorough investigation, the McNulty Memorandum au-
thorizes prosecutors to request a waiver of so-called Category II 
information.68  The McNulty Memorandum cautions that waivers 
“should only be sought in rare circumstances.”69  Category II “in-
formation includes legal advice given to the corporation before, 
during, and after the underlying misconduct occurred.”70  Thus, 
Category II information can include attorney-client protected in-
formation developed in the course of an internal investigation as 
well as legal advice given after conclusion of the investigation.  
The McNulty Memorandum cites as examples of Category II in-
formation the following: 
(i) Attorney notes, memoranda containing mental impressions and 
conclusions; 
(ii) legal determinations as a result of an internal investigation; or 
(iii) legal advice given to the corporation.71 
Category II information does not include “legal advice con-
temporaneous to the underlying misconduct when the corpora-
tion or one of its employees is relying upon an advice-of-counsel 
defense.”72  Nor does it include “legal advice or communications 
in furtherance of a crime or fraud, coming within the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege.”73  In either case, the 
McNulty Memorandum allows prosecutors to follow the proce-
dures for seeking waivers that are applicable to Category I in-
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 10. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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formation. 
Before requesting Category II information, a prosecutor 
must request authorization from the Deputy Attorney General.74  
Again, any request must set forth the legitimate need and the 
scope of the waiver sought.  “If the request is authorized, the 
[U.S.] Attorney must communicate the request in writing to the 
corporation.”75 
If the corporation declines to provide Category II informa-
tion, prosecutors may not consider a negative response to a re-
quest for Category II information in deciding whether to prose-
cute the corporation.76  However, prosecutors “may always 
favorably consider a corporation’s acquiescence to the govern-
ment’s waiver request in determining whether a corporation has 
cooperated in the government’s investigation.”77  Seemingly, 
therefore, the McNulty Memorandum has removed the “stick” for 
refusals to provide Category II information while maintaining 
the “carrot.”  In practice, however, corporations may simply not 
see it this way.  A benefit denied is likely to be perceived in much 
the same way as a punishment. 
The McNulty Memorandum’s bifurcation of information was 
likely founded upon distinctions made by some courts with re-
spect to attorney work product.78  Under this analysis, the “pre-
sumption in favor of nondisclosure is shifted with respect to fact 
work product.”79  Opinion work-product, on the other hand, is af-
forded a higher (in some cases, absolute) level of protection.80  
Even though these distinctions have been made for purposes of 
the work product doctrine, they have no application to the attor-
ney-client privilege.  Yet, the McNulty Memorandum inexplicably 
conflates these two protections without providing any rationale 
for doing so. 
The McNulty Memorandum appears to strengthen the attor-
ney-client privilege by requiring written authorization before 
seeking waivers of either Category I or Category II information.  
In practice, however, prosecutors can easily sidestep these proce-
dures.  For example, a prosecutor might still mention the benefits 
of waiving the privilege while not directly requesting a waiver.  
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See, e.g., In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Some 
courts interpreting [Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947),] have defined two types of 
work product.”). 
 79 Id. 
 80 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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Indeed, there have been anecdotal reports of such “subtle” re-
quests even before the McNulty Memorandum was issued.81 
In conclusion, the McNulty Memorandum has disappointed 
many because it is consistent with its history.  Throughout the 
saga of the Holder/Thompson/McCallum memoranda, the De-
partment of Justice has steadfastly retained the ability to seek, 
and credit as cooperation, waivers of attorney-client protections.  
The McNulty Memorandum does not break with this tradition.  It 
sets a very low bar for requests for waivers, and while it purports 
to impose additional procedural protections, prosecutors can eas-
ily circumvent these protections.   
 
 81 COALITION SUBMISSION, supra note 41, at 10 (“Other prosecutors cited in our sur-
veys employ other ‘subtle’ tactics such as tossing a copy of the Thompson Memo on the 
table with the privilege waiver section highlighted and making a statement such as ‘you’d 
like to qualify for the benefits of cooperation in this investigation, correct?’”). 
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